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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86M00612R000100040020-8

1 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Meeting of Representatives of TOD Principals


1. A special meeting, called at the request of the DCI representatives, was held in Mr. Bross' office at 1600 hours, 1 June 1967.

2. In attendance were Messrs Bross, Fischer, Benington, Showers, [redacted]

3. The reason for the meeting is evident from the opening remarks of the DCI representatives (attached).


4. The meeting concluded at 1815 hours with an agreement that Messrs Fischer, Benington and Showers were to be in touch with their seniors, as necessary, and to make telephonic comments to Mr. Bross by the close of business 2 June 1967. It is probable that a further meeting of this group should be held before Mr. Benington calls another meeting of the full TOD committee.

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cc: Mr. Bross/Mr. Parrott
General Reynolds
General Taylor
[redacted]

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THIS PAPER WAS THE INITIAL MATTER DISCUSSED.
LATER IN THIS MEETING, BENINGTON CIRCULATED
REVISED T/R DTD 31 MAY (ALSO HEREIN). REYNOLDS
AGREED TO RESPOND TO THESE T/R IN A FEW DAYS,
C SUGGESTED A FURTHER MEETING.
THE REPS. OF THE PRINCIPALS [redacted] AFTER CONSIDERATION

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THE REPS. OF THE PRINCIPALS [redacted] AFTER CONSIDERATION

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SUBJECT : Opening Statement by DCI Representative
in TOD Meeting, 1 June 1967

I. We asked for this meeting because
of our concern -- which we hope is not well-founded -- that the TOD committee was moving toward developing matrices of a substantially different character than we thought were called for under our understanding of the original concepts of the principals.

In short we are concerned -- perhaps wrongly--that the TOD frame of reference is being oriented principally to serving the purposes of current decision making by program and budgeting officials.

However, rather than press that concern at this moment, I would like to ask us to focus on the main issue, which Herb Benington properly listed as number one on his list of inquiries in the development of the Terms of Reference:

This is the question of "Who is to Use TOD."

This is the same question which General Carroll asked Mr. Gross yesterday.

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[redacted] and I have expressed concern in the TOD meetings about the proper content of the TOD matrices. We think this is merely another way of stating the foregoing central question--Who is to use TOD?

On the answer to this question depends the matter of whether the content of the matrices shall be oriented primarily to financial categories and organizational entities or--as we think is more appropriate -- to substantive intelligence targets and activities.

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II. In addressing the question: "Who is TOD for?", may we briefly refer to the exchanges among the principals which underlie the start of this project.

A. BOB Bulletin 66-3 of October 1965 directed the implementation of a P-P-B system in DOD, CIA and numerous other federal agencies.

B. BOB letter to DCI of October 29, 66 requested DCI to consider the application of the enclosed Harry Rowen report to the intelligence community.

This paper is entitled "Improving the Intelligence Requirements Process". Its major thrust is to advocate a matrix (which we now are calling a Target-Oriented Display) in order to "see that the resource implications of meeting various intelligence 'requirements' are made visible".

The Rowen matrix is surprisingly similar to that which the DCI representatives have proposed to the TOD committee. It calls for an ordering of resources by targets, by organization and type of activity, and by the information flow functions of collection, processing, production, etc.

C. DCI letter November 10, 66 to Mr. Schultze agrees that the Rowen approach "should be possible and valuable ... in the entire intelligence community", although there are difficulties (see letter, para. 2).

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III. Requirements Plus Resource Implications
Equal PLANNING.

We believe that TOD is most appropriately used as a substantive planning tool.

We see TOD as related principally to Planning -- the first step in the P-P-B cycle.

IV. DCI role as coordinator of the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort, under Presidential letter to DCI of 24 September 1965.

It is in the area of PLANNING, rather than PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING that inter-agency coordination can be most effectively achieved.

We are advocating community planning followed by individual agencies accepting primary responsibility for conducting their own detailed programming and budgeting.

We see an important and useful role for BOB in both of these two areas, although the nature of their specific interest will differ as between Planning and Programming/Budgeting.

V. The forum available to the intelligence community for its coordination on substantive problems and plans is the USIB forum.

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VI. Accordingly, to answer General Carroll's and Mr. Benington's questions -- "Who is TOD For?" --we submit that:

TOD is a substantive intelligence planning tool, to be prepared in order to assist the USIB/NRO agency directors, the Director BOB and the DCI.

These agency heads will use TOD in the USIB context as a frame of reference for community planning, as a take off point for substantive analysis of the resource implications of 'requirements' and also as a take off point for the analysis of other selected problems of importance to the community.

In their individual agency head capacities, we foresee these individuals referring to TOD as a general guide for the programming and budgeting of their agencies.

We do not foresee the use of TOD by program and budget officials within the individual agencies at the working level. We do not think it appropriate that the details of the resources of one agency should be made known to working level personnel in a second agency.

As indicated above, we foresee key BOB personnel using TOD to assist them in their role of oversight and review, to inform themselves of the character of community planning and the appropriateness of the individual agencies follow-through in programming and budgeting.

We see the TOD as useful to ASD (Systems Analysis) as a point of departure when that office shares the responsibility with intelligence agencies for the study of selected intelligence problems of magnitude.

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VII. As compared to the foregoing concept of TOD as a tool for substantive intelligence planning, we have been seriously concerned that the discussions in the TOD committee are leading in a markedly different direction.

We would be happy to be assured that we are mistaken, but we have seen indications that some participants are visualizing TOD primarily as a tool for firm decision-making by the programmers and budgeteers.

This is to say that we have seen indications that some participants are visualizing TOD primarily as a tool of Programming and Budgeting, the last two letters in P-P-B.

VIII. We recommend that the TOD Committee move away from any such possible implications.

(A) We think that the TOD has a much more important use as a planning tool. This is the area of PPB which needs the most strengthening, as Harry Rowen suggested. It is in the Planning area where projects are conceived or initiated in concept -- this is where projects are started down a correct or a divergent track; this is where the individual agencies are best able to act on a community basis.

(B) It is in the Planning area, we think that there is the best chance for developing TOD in a meaningful and objective manner, providing a framework for the presentation of substantive and detailed data.

(C) If TOD is allowed to become a tool of individual agency programming and budgeting, it becomes vulnerable to a host of bureaucratic evils, to suspect information, and to gamesmanship. As such, TOD becomes merely another paper exercise for program and budget review, and the three sponsoring officials will be thwarted in their effort to create a new device for a new and needed purpose.

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(D) This is not to say that the TOD matrices, as we learn to understand their uses, capabilities and limitations, may not be useful for some programming and budgeting purposes. But not, we submit, in the first instance, and before the new infant has learned to crawl, if not to walk.

(E) Accordingly, we hope that the TOD committee will now seek to develop TOD as an instrument consonant with the general outline proposed by Mr. Rowen and Mr. Schultze, and toward the achievement of which the DCI has been working in fulfillment of his commitment to Mr. Schultze.

(F) It is pertinent also to note that the exchanges of correspondence among the three principals, along with a memorandum from Mr. Enthoven, are all consistent with the concept that the principal and most immediate utility of TOD is as a PLANNING tool, rather than as a servant of Programming or Budgeting or "instant decision-making".

(1) Note that Mr. Enthoven's memo of 13 April 67 stated that "Since the display will be a broad depiction and analysis of the intelligence process rather than a detailed accounting of resources and costs, I think it is essential that representatives be more experienced in planning and analysis of intelligence activities rather than in programming and budgeting".



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